Tens of Thousands Still Without Power in Tennessee. The Real Cause Isn’t just the Weather.

An Investigative Op-Ed on Maintenance, Vegetation Policy, and Governance at Nashville Electric Service

As of today, large portions of Davidson County have experienced extended power outages following the recent winter storm. Severe weather was the trigger. It was not the sole cause of the duration or scale of failure. The length of these outages reflects years of operational choices involving vegetation management, asset maintenance, and risk tolerance—choices shaped by governance, budgeting, and local policy.

This is not an argument that storms can be prevented. It is an argument that outcomes can be materially reduced by disciplined maintenance and hardening decisions made long before ice hits the lines.

What actually fails in ice storms

In Middle Tennessee ice events, outages are driven primarily by vegetation. Ice loads accumulate on limbs. Limbs fall into primary conductors. Lines come down. Poles snap under compounded stress. Restoration time expands exponentially once poles, transformers, and entire spans must be rebuilt instead of re-energized.

Utilities that shorten outage duration do so by reducing tree-to-line contact before storms, replacing aging poles, and concentrating aggressive trimming in high-risk corridors. Utilities that do not see longer, cascading failures.

NES vegetation policy versus field reality

NES states that it maintains a vegetation management cycle of roughly three to four years per circuit. On paper, that aligns with industry norms. The operational question is whether that cycle is fully executed, sufficiently funded, and targeted where risk is highest.

Residents across Davidson County are seeing widespread tree failures along distribution lines. That raises specific, testable questions:

  • When was each affected circuit last trimmed?

  • Was trimming limited to minimum clearance, or was enhanced trimming applied in dense-canopy and historically problematic spans?

  • How many miles of line were deferred due to budget limits, contractor availability, or community resistance?

  • Were known hazard trees removed proactively, or left because removal is unpopular and time-consuming?

A stated policy does not equal field execution. Reliability is determined at the circuit level, not in press releases.

Governance and priority-setting

NES is governed by an Electric Power Board whose members are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the Metro Council. That structure sets priorities, approves budgets, and determines acceptable tradeoffs between cost, disruption, and reliability.

When leadership environments prioritize minimizing complaints, visual disruption, or political friction, utilities tend to soften vegetation work. Aggressive trimming generates immediate backlash. Deferred trimming generates delayed outages. The political cost of the former is immediate and visible. The cost of the latter is abstract—until a storm makes it visible.

This dynamic is not unique to Nashville, but it is amplified in cities with long-standing one-party governance, where external accountability pressure is weaker and institutional habits harden over time.

Urban forestry, permitting, and operational friction

Nashville maintains strong urban forestry and tree-protection norms. Those policies have environmental benefits. They also create operational friction if not balanced against grid reliability.

If removal approvals are slow, trimming standards are constrained, or public pushback discourages decisive action, utilities default to minimum compliance. Minimum compliance is insufficient in ice-prone regions with dense canopy and aging infrastructure.

The result is predictable: storms expose every deferred decision at once.

Asset condition matters as much as weather

Extended outages are also tied to asset age. Older poles fail at higher rates under ice load. Deferred pole replacement increases the number of locations requiring full reconstruction rather than simple re-energization.

An honest review requires disclosure of:

  • Pole age distribution across the county

  • Annual pole replacement rates over the last decade

  • Inspection backlogs and deferrals

  • Capital spending trends relative to system growth and canopy expansion

Without those figures, claims that this was purely a “historic storm” are incomplete.

What accountability looks like

If Metro leadership and the NES board want to restore credibility, the response must be operational, not rhetorical:

  • Publish circuit-level vegetation histories and last-trim dates

  • Release vegetation management budgets and contractor capacity trends

  • Disclose tree-related outage metrics over time

  • Commission an independent after-action review separating unavoidable damage from preventable failure modes

  • Adopt enhanced trimming standards for high-risk feeders and publish the map

  • Tie executive evaluation to measurable reliability improvement, not communications performance

These steps are standard in utilities that take reliability seriously.

Bottom line

Ice storms are inevitable. Multi-day outages affecting tens of thousands of customers are not. The duration of Davidson County’s power failures reflects accumulated maintenance decisions, vegetation management discipline, and governance priorities.

If those systems are not examined honestly and corrected, the next storm will produce the same result. The only variable will be how long customers are told to wait.

Picture of Craig Bushon

Craig Bushon

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